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In many developing countries, small and medium enterprises (SMEs) account for a large part 
of national income, exports, and employment. Therefore, governments have used various strategies 
and policy instruments to develop the human resources of SMEs and improve their productivity and 
national welfare. 
In the case of Korea, SMEs account for 99.9 percent of total enterprises, provide 87.5 percent of 
total contracted employment opportunities, and about half of the national exports and income 
(Small and Medium Business Administration and Korea Federation of Small Businesses 2008). 
However, SMEs continuously complained that securing technical and skilled workers was the most 
serious business bottleneck (Korea Federation of Small Businesses 2003a, 2003b). The Government 
of Korea has, therefore, also adopted various policies to encourage private enterprises in general 
and SMEs specifically to undertake the training of their workers voluntarily. Historically, the policy 
instruments used by the government since the 1950s included apprenticeship, direct provision of 
accelerated training by public training institutes, subsidies for training by enterprises, requirement 
of compulsory training by enterprises, public provision of training again but financed by training 
levies collected from enterprises, and finally, the levy rebate incentive system introduced in 1995, 
which obligated all enterprises to pay training levies  as part of the fees for the employment 
insurance of their workers, but paid back the levies as a grant to those enterprises training their 
workers. 
It has been proved, nonetheless, that the levy grant system did not significantly impact on SMEs, 
and only large enterprises benefited from it. To redress this regressive effect of the levy grant 
system, the private sector, in collaboration with the government and non-governmental 
organizations, undertook a pilot SME Training Consortiums (TC) Project in 2001. The pilot project 
provided  a group of SMEs with institutional and technical assistance to  train their workers by 
financing training specialists hired by the group of SMEs collectively. SMEs actively participated in 
the  training of their workers and benefited from productivity increases, resulting in successful 
outcomes. (For an elaboration of the history of training systems and finance in Korea, refer to Lee 
2006.) 
In the wake of the Asian financial crisis, the government actively promoted SMEs to organize TCs 
and carry out training. As a result, the TC project has, on the one hand, become the mainstay of 2 
government-supported training programs. On the other, it still accounts for only a small portion of 
total SMEs in terms of the number of SMEs participating in TCs, the number of SME workers trained, 
and the amount of rebates received by SMEs in comparison with the training levies paid by them. 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate  the causes of the sluggish development of the TC 
program since the successful completion of its pilot stage and to come up with a set of policy 
suggestions to solve the problems. This section of the paper is followed by a second section on a 
brief review of the rationale, objectives, and content of the pilot TC project and its achievements; a 
third section on the causes of the inactive development of the TC project; and finally a section on 
the policy suggestions to revitalize the TC project, together with lessons learned. 3 
I.  THE PILOT TRAINING CONSORTIUMS PROJECT 
1.1  Origins of the Training Consortiums Project 
The pilot Training Consortiums (TC) Project was conceived in the wake of the Asian financial 
crisis. The financial crisis quickly spread to the real sectors of the economy, which in turn devastated 
the labor market in 1998. The Korean government was desperate to lower the high unemployment 
rate in the short run and encouraged enterprises to raise their international competitiveness in the 
long run. It was against this background that the Korean Chamber of Commerce and Industry (KCCI) 
prepared a pilot project for SME training consortiums (TCs) in 1999 and applied, through the 
government to the World Bank/Asia and Europe Economic Meeting (ASEM), for a grant to launch it. 
The project was initially implemented only in Busan City, which was hit hardest by the economic 
crisis, from June 2001 through December 2002. With the signs of promising prospects, the Ministry 
of Labor provided additional funds to the KCCI for implementation of the project in two other cities 
(Incheon and Kwangjoo) in September 2001 and extended the pilot to June 2002. 
1.2  Rationale of the Training Consortiums Project 
Although the levy rebate system did serve as an effective incentive for job-related skills 
development, it has worked regressively. Special attention was paid to compensate SMEs with 
greater financial incentives for their training activities. The level of rebate for large firms was to be 
at 100 percent of training levies paid. However, SMEs were to receive rebates of training levies up to 
270 percent. Despite the special financial incentive, SMEs did not avail themselves of the incentive 
system as much as large enterprises. Consequently, a regressive situation developed. 
Both large firms and SMEs pay training levies, yet a disproportionate share of the reimbursements 
went to large firms. While 77.6 percent of large enterprises trained 37.5 percent of their total 
workers, making use of the training-levy rebate incentive system in 2002, only 4.7 percent of SMEs 
offered training programs to only 4.2 percent of their total workers, receiving the training-levy 
rebates. Of the total 6.9 million employees who paid the training levy (actually paid by employers as 
part of employment insurance fees), SME workers accounted for 65 percent (or 4.5 million workers). 
However, the number of SME workers who undertook training programs and received the training-4 
levy rebates accounted for only 4.2 percent (or 192,000 workers) of all SME workers in 2002. In 
contrast, while workers of large enterprises accounted for only 35 percent (or 2.4 million workers) of 
total workers paying training levies, about 37.5 percent (or 904,000 workers) of their workers 
participated in training programs and received training-levy rebates (Lee and Kim 2004). Thus, large 
enterprises were able to recover their training levies at a much higher rate than SMEs. While large 
enterprises as a whole got about 30 percent of their training levies reimbursed in 2002, SMEs 
recovered only 15 percent of their training levies.     
The (recovery) rate between rebates received per trained worker and the training levy paid per 
worker—the financial rate of return—was higher among SMEs than large enterprises. While the 
recovery rate was between 66 and 100 percent for large enterprises in 2002, it was between 126 
and 905 percent for different groups of SMEs by the size of employees. In other words, for each 
worker participating in training, the recovery rate was greater among SMEs than large enterprises 
due to the more favorable incentive given to SMEs. Despite this favorable financial incentive given 
to SMEs, it is a striking fact that a regressive situation developed between large enterprises and 
SMEs. 
This situation implies that financial incentives (financial rates of return) were either inadequate or 
insufficient for SMEs to undertake the training of their workers. For SMEs, the costs or disincentives 
(e.g., training costs, poaching risks, administrative burdens to arrange training and recover levies, 
asymmetry of available information on training markets) must have been greater than the financial 
incentives. Besides the rebate incentive, additional factors should have been considered and the 
government should have taken greater action to redress the regressive result of the training-levy 
rebate incentive system. 
Some discernible characteristics between large enterprises and SMEs in their training performance 
enable us to identify possible causes of the regressive utilization of the incentive. They are the scale 
jeopardy, public good jeopardy, financial jeopardy, and institutional and organizational jeopardy of 
SMEs in developing their human resources (Lee 2006). 
First is the scale jeopardy of SMEs. SMEs, because of their small number of employees, must have 
found it difficult to organize in-plant training programs or arrange suitable institutional training 
programs outside the enterprise. SMEs in general do not have the flexibility to send workers for 5 
external training without disrupting their production schedule, and they incur a higher training cost 
per worker, compared with large enterprises. Furthermore, SME workers usually have to carry out 
multiple tasks and possess a broader range of skills due to the size of the enterprise and the nature 
of technology they adopt. Not only do SMEs have justifiable reasons to be compensated for their 
extra training costs on equity grounds, they also confront difficulties organizing formal in-house 
training programs  for in-service or pre-service training courses or entering  into contracts  with 
outside training institutions (i.e., supplier-oriented training courses). 
Administrative and managerial workers also  participated in training at a higher rate than 
production-related workers since more educated and skilled workers are inclined to have a higher 
level of learning efficiency. This tendency reflects employers’ recognition that returns to training are 
higher among administrative and professional workers than production-related workers, which is 
supported by empirical studies (Groot 1995). With a small number of administrative and managerial 
workers and little flexibility, SMEs were also disadvantaged in the training of workers who would 
bring in higher returns. 
Second is the public goods jeopardy of SMEs. Like education, training is public or semi-public goods, 
especially merit goods (Musgrave 1959; Freedman 1962), and both have positive externalities. 
Trained workers prove more valuable than before not only to the current employers, but to other 
enterprises. Therefore, trained workers  often become a subject of poaching, especially by 
competing but free-riding enterprises, which usually offer better working conditions and career 
prospects but do not offer adequate in-service training. Workers in SMEs generally stay with the 
same employer for a shorter period than in larger enterprises and have a higher separation rate. As 
such, entrepreneurs are reluctant to provide or finance training with their own funds just like any 
other public goods. Since the demand for a socially optimal quantity of skills training is larger than 
the market-determined quantity of training, the cost of training is higher than in an equilibrium 
market. The  government needs to increase the quantity of skills training by subsidizing SMEs 
adequately to compensate for the higher training costs.   
Third is the financial jeopardy of SMEs. Training is an investment in human capital over a relatively 
long gestation period, and the returns to the investment accrue over a long period. The limited 
financial and credit situation of SMEs does not allow them to invest in their workers as much as 6 
larger enterprises and have justification to be assisted by the government in financing their training 
costs for national economic strength. 
Fourth  is the institutional and technical jeopardy of SMEs.  They  do not have anyone working 
exclusively on the planning, organization, and management of the training of their workers. Even 
though SMEs could identify priority training needs, they did not have specialized staff members who 
could determine suitable outside training institutions, negotiate with them, enter into a contract for 
institutional training programs, monitor their training processes, evaluate the training effectiveness, 
and/or handle the cumbersome processes for the reimbursement of their training expenses. The 
cost of hiring a training/HRD officer would be higher than the rebated amount of the training levies. 
These factors contributed to the low level of SME participation in the skills development program, 
and the government had to take action to address the institutional and technical problems. 
SMEs were responsive to the incentive system in terms of choosing the type of training. When the 
government deregulated the training system between 1995 and 1999, enterprises radically shifted 
their priorities from pre-service training for new labor market entrants to in-service training of 
employed workers. The share of in-service training soared from 66 percent in 1994 to 97 percent of 
all trainees in 1999, and to 98 percent in 2001 (Ministry of Labor, 2003). This implies that SMEs place 
greater emphasis on in-service training than pre-service or transfer training to adapt their workers 
to the industrial restructuring, changing technologies for high value-added products, and shortening 
product cycles. Historically, SMEs have had institutional and informational difficulties in making 
training arrangements with public training institutes, which focus on pre-service training and do not 
offer in-service training programs for enterprises, especially for SMEs. Asymmetries of information 
between the large enterprises—with personnel/HRD officers and the ability to organize and often 
offer in-service training programs for their own workers in-plant or in the workplace—and the SMEs 
compounded the regression. 
Fifth was the adverse government incentive system. Employers responded  to the levy  rebate 
incentive system by initially emphasizing institutional training instead of on-the-job or in-plant 
training. Rebates for institutional training courses were twice that for in-plant training courses, and 
a ceiling was placed on the total grants made for on-the-job training conducted by each firm. In 
1999, 47.4 percent of enterprises undertaking enterprise training courses carried them out under 
contracts with outside training institutions. This proportion rose to 53.2 percent in 2000, but 7 
declined to 46 percent of enterprises in 2001 and to 47 percent in 2002 (Lee and Kim 2004). This 
change reflects the practice of SMEs, which had been increasingly participating in in-service training 
programs, but in the form of in-plant or on-the-job training. SMEs found the in-plant or on-the-job 
training mode more compatible with their production technology and comparative advantage of 
their small size and teamwork, and it also curtailed poaching of their workers by minimizing contact 
with workers from other enterprises. Although about 52 percent of all enterprises chose in-plant 
training in 2002, about 80 percent of SMEs relied on it  (Korea  Small  and Medium  Business 
Administration 2002). Nevertheless, the government’s incentive system ran against the in-plant or 
on-the-job training mode, and public training institutions did not offer mobile training programs. 
Finally, a greater proportion of male workers underwent training than female workers. While 15.5 
percent of male workers participated in training, only 8.9 percent of female workers took training 
courses. Since female workers in general have a higher incidence of separation and a shorter career 
due to marriage, childbirth and child rearing, employers tend to eschew female workers in selecting 
trainees (Lee et al. 2001). SMEs tend to use the training incentive system less actively than large 
enterprises  because  women  represent  a greater portion of total employees among SMEs (31 
percent) than in large enterprises (27 percent). Therefore, to promote enterprise-provided training, 
it would be effective to establish greater incentives for SMEs so that they may more easily select 
female workers as trainees.   
In sum, SMEs participated in training at a much lower rate than larger enterprises, and the training-
levy  rebate incentive system, alone,  proved to be inadequate.  Additional or different types of 
incentives should have been devised to compensate SMEs for their disadvantages in undertaking the 
training of their workers. Besides financial constraints, SMEs  have institutional and 
informational/technical weaknesses. Lepenies also argued that because of information asymmetries 
inherent in training markets, there is a strong need for introducing institutionalized ex-ante and ex-
post “voice” in a voucher project for worker training (Lepenies 2004). To help solve the institutional 
/ technical / informational constraints in SMEs, a new incentive system had to be found so that 
more SMEs could actively train their workers. The answer was the Training Consortiums Project. 
1.3  Objectives of the Training Consortiums Project 8 
The project aimed at preventing further aggravation of unemployment and improving the 
productivity of already-employed workers of SMEs by helping a group of SMEs organize themselves 
for the management of in-service training of their workers and retraining of unemployed workers. 
The pilot project focused on SMEs because they were hit hardest by the Asian crisis, held greater 
capacity for employment, and  had lower  productivity. To stem further deterioration of 
unemployment, SMEs needed to retain their current workers and increase their employment. This 
would prove impossible unless  they  improve  the  skill levels  and  productivity  of their workers. 
Despite the favorable training-levy rebate incentive, SMEs were not actively participating in the 
system. The challenge that the government faced was how to encourage SMEs to provide training 
programs for their workers, taking advantage of the training-levy rebate incentive, and ultimately 
improving productivity. 
1.4  Project Activities and Processes 
The project consisted of four phases: (i) planning and organization of a training consortium, 
(ii) training-needs survey and training program development for each member SME, (iii) training 
service provision and monitoring, and (iv) outcome evaluations. The focus of the activities was that 
each local Chamber of Commerce and Industry helped  a group of 30-50 SMEs organize into a 
training consortium (TC) by financing and seconding two training managers to each TC. Each TC 
formed an operating committee (OC) to manage its training tasks. The OC was composed of 
representatives of TC members, local Chamber, Ministry of Labor field office, and training experts, 
and met periodically for the planning and management of the training affairs of the TC members. 
The objective was to encourage SMEs to organize themselves to launch skills training programs for 
their workers voluntarily and in partnership with other stakeholders (Lee 2006). To achieve this 
objective, the project provided a group of organized  SMEs with training specialists financed by 
public funds to relieve the organizational, informational, and financial constraints that SMEs face in 
developing their human resources. Individually, each SME could not afford to hire its own training 
specialist. 
The two training managers (TMs) were to play key roles for the TC. The TMs were to act as the 
training specialist of each member SME. They were to establish an information network among TC 
members (e.g., home page, email systems, and periodic meetings); conduct a training-needs survey 9 
of each member SME through interviews with managers and workers, and through job analysis; plan 
for and program training activities of member SMEs; contract outside training institutions to train 
workers collectively as much as possible; collaborate with training institutions to develop training 
programs and materials; monitor their training activities; and conduct an evaluation study upon 
completion of major training courses on behalf of the member SMEs. 
Other countries have adopted similar systems to provide financial incentives to SMEs so that they 
undertake the training of their workers, such as tax incentive systems (e.g., World Bank 2002) or 
levy rebate systems (Gill et al. 1999). However, the TC project was different from the simple tax 
incentive system in the sense that it  obligated all enterprises to pay training levies in advance 
irrespective of the fact that they offered in-plant training or not. The project mobilized additional 
public resources for the financial incentives and discouraged free-riders. The TC project also 
diverged from the simple levy rebate system by providing preferential rebates to SMEs. And, the TC 
project was unique in the sense that the financial incentives created a structure that limited the 
hiring of training managers explicitly to groups of SMEs, thus economizing public resources and 
helping SMEs fill their gap in institutional and technical capacities. 
1.5  Main Results of the Training Consortiums Project 
1.5.1  Methodology and Data of Evaluation 
The objective of our study of the pilot Training Consortiums Project is not to compare the 
costs and benefits of the training programs themselves. Many studies in the literature have already 
vouched  for  the efficiency and economic viability of enterprise-provided training programs in 
different parts of the world, including Korea (Bartel 2000; Barret and O’Connell 2001; Groot 1995; 
Kim et al. 2003; Lee et al. 2004). On the basis of this accumulated knowledge of the high returns to 
investment in employer-provided training programs, this study rather attempts to assess whether 
the government policy through the pilot project has been effective. In other words, did  the 
government policy stimulate and encourage SMEs to undertake training programs for their workers 
voluntarily, and redress inequities caused by the previous policies. The reason for this focus of our 
assessment is that even though the training programs’ financial and economic returns to individual 
workers of SMEs were much higher than to those of large enterprises, few SMEs participated in the 
training of their workers under the training-levy rebate incentive system. 10 
To assess the effectiveness of the government policy scientifically, it is necessary to collect data on 
the outputs and the effects on the pilot project TC groups, and compare them with the experience 
of the groups that have similar social and economic characteristics but did not receive the project 
assistance (Grossman 1994). Since no control groups were selected randomly before launching the 
pilot project, this scientific and experimental evaluation method could not be used. 
Therefore, a quasi-experimental method had to be adopted by selecting control groups after the 
pilot project was launched and by adjusting for differences in observable and unobservable 
attributes of the control and experimental groups. As experimental groups, this study takes the 
SMEs, which were members of the TCs in Busan, Kwangju and Incheon, depending on the data 
available. As control groups, this study has adopted “all SMEs nationwide” and “all enterprises 
nationwide.” Ideally, the differences in the observable and non-observable attributes of the 
experimental and control groups have to be adjusted or corrected. However, it is assumed that the 
experimental groups are randomly selected from the control groups since the individual 
experimental group is so small compared with the control groups, and there are no clear distinctions 
between SMEs of different regions in terms of factors affecting training. 
For the experimental groups, the data were collected from surveys of the TC-member SMEs, which 
were conducted through questionnaires with the help of the KCCI at the beginning (June 2001) and 
at the end of the pilot project (December 2001 and June 2002). These survey data were 
complemented by intensive interviews with managers and workers of selected SMEs in each of the 
three cities at the same time as the surveys (Lee 2006). 
Data for the control groups were obtained from the Quarterly Employment Trends of the 
Employment Information Center of the Human Resources Development Service of Korea, and the 
Current Situation of the Occupational Skills Development Program, an annual report of the Ministry 
of Labor. 
1.5.2  Organization and Operation of Training Consortiums 
Originally, the project aimed to organize 90-member SMEs into three training consortiums 
(TCs). However, the project started with 163-member SMEs in three TCs, one in each of the three 
Chamber areas. By the end of 2002, TC members increased to 732 SMEs—an increase of four and 
half times. The 557 member SMEs in June 2002 had a total of 14,043 workers with 65 percent of 11 
them being production workers. About 70 percent of the member SMEs were those with less than 
50 workers and were located in the industrial zones developed by the government. 
Despite the sharp increases in the number of member SMEs, only one TC was maintained in each of 
three areas throughout the project implementation period. This enabled each TC to enjoy 
economies of scale. However, each TC’s operational effectiveness was gradually lowered to less 
than optimum, having too many and diverse member SMEs belonging to different industrial 
associations. As a result, the training managers (TMs) could not provide tailor-made advice and 
attention to each member SME. Also, a TC lost homogeneity and solidarity among member SMEs. It 
became difficult to organize training courses to accommodate the diverse but small number of 
workers of each member SME belonging to different industrial sectors. Each course had too small a 
number of trainees to offer courses economically. This prodded TMs to increase the number of 
member SMEs irrespective of the industrial sector. This in turn aggravated the problem of organizing 
economical courses. In retrospect, it would have been better to organize each TC by SMEs belonging 
to the same trade association, as originally planned, and the ratio between each TM and the number 
of SMEs of each TC should have been maintained. 
1.5.3  Participation in In-Service Training 
The output of the project was impressive. In the in-service training courses for workers 
already-employed in SMEs, a total of 6,573 persons were trained. This number far exceeds the 
number of workers identified initially by employers in the training needs survey as requiring in-
service training (3,087) and accounts for almost half the total number of workers in all member 
SMEs of the three pilot TCs (Table 1). Another notable fact is that about 50 percent of all trainees 
had more than 10 years of service with the member SMEs (Lee 2006). 
Most courses lasted from 1 to 30 days, and about 60 percent of the total workers who participated 
in the training programs went through only one training course per worker, and the balance of the 
workers took two or three training courses per worker. The subjects of training courses were not 
confined to technical skills, but also included management, accounting, tax administration, and 
motivation skills of middle and high level managers. This is a good sign that was not noted in the 
past since public training centers did not offer such courses. Studies abroad indicate that among 12 
many types of enterprise training, economic and administrative training yields much higher wage 
gains than technical training (Groot 1995). 
Training programs and materials were developed by contracted training institutions and the training 
managers. Altogether, 65 training programs were developed on the basis of the analyses of 140 job 
categories, 147 modular training syllabi and texts were developed for 14 job categories, and 13 
programmed learning materials were prepared for trainees to study employing computers. 
Table 1: Output of In-Service Training for Employees (2002) 
  Total  Busan  Incheon  Gwangiu 
Actual Trainees*  6,573  2,353  1,837  2,383 
Planned Trainees  3,087  871  1,573  643 
Actual / Target  213%  270%  117%  371% 
Note:    * Multiple counted each time a worker was trained. 
Source:    KCCI. 
1.5.4    Training-Levy Rebates to SMEs 
The project accorded substantial financial benefits to member SMEs by helping them 
organize  the  training of their workers and then get reimbursed for training expenses from the 
training-levy (a part of the unemployment insurance) funds.  Before the initiation of this pilot 
project, SME had rarely provided training opportunities for their workers, and therefore had not 
been able to get their training levy reimbursed. 
With the advent of the pilot project, training managers facilitated training opportunities for SMEs 
workers, which enabled active  participation in the reimbursement process. Consequently, the 
proportion of TC-member enterprises offering training to their workers increased from 11 percent 
to 50 percent, an increase of 451 percent. This compares favorably with an increase from 21 percent 
to 57 percent or an increase of 271 percent for all sizes of enterprises nationwide (Table 2).   13 
Table 2:  Number of TC-Member SMEs Participating in Training-Levy Rebates 





Busan  31  127  410 
Incheon  56  118  211 
Gwangiu  110  172  156 
Source:    KCCI and Employment Information Center. 
The TC-member training-levy recovery rate (the ratio between the training levy paid by member 
SMEs and the reimbursement received for training workers) of the Busan TC increased from 24 
percent of total paid training levies to 48 percent, which contrasts with the decrease from 25.5 to 
14.6 percent for all SMEs nationwide. The recovered training levy in the Busan TC area increased by 
18 million won during the pilot project period (Table 3). The regressive outcome of the training-levy 
rebate system was effectively redressed. 
Table 3:  Training-Levy Recovery Rates (Unit: Won) 





Busan TC Members 
Total Training Levy Paid  116,138,630  95,990,480  -20,147,110 
Total Rebates  28,129,250  46,489.050  18,359,800 
Recovery Rate  24.2 %  48.4 %  200% 
All Enterprises Nationwide 
Recovery Rate  33.0%  24.8%  -25% 
All SMEs Nationwide 
Recovery Rate  25.5%  14.6%  -43% 
Source:    KCCI/Busan and Employment Information Center. 
1.6    Other Results of the TC Project 
Although this study does not attempt to make a cost-benefit analysis of the project, it is 
appropriate to mention some positive effects. The project promoted SME worker productivity, 
solving the most critical SME problem of skilled manpower shortage, and helped prevent 
unemployment. In addition, the project also motivated the government and training institutions to 
change their training policy towards a  demand-driven system; developed a  new working 
relationships between SMEs and training institutions; and promoted a partnership between private 
sector associations and public/non-governmental organizations (Lee 2006). 14 
1.6.1  Promotion of SME Productivity 
This project enhanced the capability of SME workers and promoted SME productivity. For 
example, in the welding course, trainees scored only 65 points average in a skills test before the 
course; however, they scored 93 points average after the course (Busan Chamber area). 
At an ex-post evaluation through interviews with member SMEs, employers revealed that workers’ 
job performance and productivity improved sharply after training (81 percent of total responses); 
savings in maintenance and repair expenses resulted (67 percent of responses); factory machinery 
utilization factor increased (88 percent of responses); wastage or defective products declined (72 
percent  of responses) (Incheon Chamber area). Also, many employers indicated that workers 
attitudes towards their jobs changed most noticeably (88 percent of responses) (Gwangju Chamber 
area). 
Interestingly, the practice of poaching or scouting workers by other enterprises declined 
substantially since all SMEs of the same trade and area joined the TC. Industry-wide collective action 
reduced the risks of training and poaching. Thus workers stayed longer with the same SME and 
consequently, SME productivity was enhanced. 
1.6.2    Prevention of Unemployment 
This project helped prevent SME workers from becoming unemployed. This effect of the 
project was important in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis when the level of unemployment 
was unusually high. According to the TC survey conducted in June 2001, those member SMEs that 
participated actively in the training programs of a TC were reluctant to lay off their workers and, in 
fact, slightly increased the overall employment level by 1.7 percent (81 persons). In contrast, those 
member SMEs that did not participate in the training programs of a TC, suffered from a reduction in 
the total employment level by 8.8 percent (436 persons), aggravating the unemployment level of 
their workers (Table 4) (Lee 2005).  Although these statistics may be criticized on the basis of 
possible selection biases, there is no strong reason to suspect that TC  members  had sharply 
different business prospects since they all joined the same TC voluntarily at the same time for a 
similar purpose. 15 
Table 4:    Employment Level of Participating versus Non-Participating   
SMEs in Training 
 








Participating SMEs  Total  4,850  4,931  81 (1.7)  63- 
Busan  1,069  1,057  -12 (1.1)  17 
Incheon  1,691  1,637  -54 (3.2)  17 
Gwangju  2,090  2,237  147 (7.0)  29 
Non-Participating 
SMEs 
Total  4,960  4,524  -436 (8.8)  97 
Busan  786  755  -31 (3.9)  19 
Incheon  2,888  2,870  -18 (0.6)  47 
Gwangju  1,286  899  -387 (30.1)  31 
Source:    KCCI. 
1.6.3  Demand-Driven Training Systems 
The pilot training consortiums  project enabled TC-member SMEs to meet their training 
needs, especially in-service. The project demonstrated the need for, and feasibility of, shifting the 
emphasis of training from exclusively pre-service training toward in-service training of SME workers 
on the job. While demographic and economic growth rates have stabilized, reducing the supply of 
and demand for young trainees, the need for training has increased for already-employed workers 
to adapt their job skills to restructured industry, changing technology, and shortening product life-
cycles. 
Before this project, large enterprises could conduct in-service training in their own training facilities, 
while SMEs lacked the financial or managerial capacity and staff to establish and operate their own 
or  joint-training facilities. Until the training consortium was organized, training in SMEs  had 
depended entirely on public training institutions that concentrated on pre-service training of youth 
for possible hiring by SMEs and did not offer in-service training. 
With the advent of the project, training took place mostly under contracts with outside training 
institutes; yet, a substantial number of training courses were conducted in-plant of member SMEs, 
using their own machines, tools, equipment, and materials. In these cases, the SME often closed 
down their production lines for several days to involve all workers in the training courses. The 
training institutions took their training instructors and equipment to the plant in a vehicle. This 
means that micro-enterprises or SMEs often prefer to train all their workers at the same time and 
in-plant, rather than sending their workers one by one to training institutions at different times. This 
mode of training met the special needs of micro-enterprises and SMEs, since they prefer to protect 16 
their unique technical know-how and promote teamwork and solidarity among their small number 
of workers. 
This project also motivated the Ministry of Labor to change its training policy toward a demand-
oriented training system and aided its decision to provide financial support to replicate the project 
scheme with two more local chambers in September 2001, then later with three more employers 
associations in January 2002. In addition, the Ministry replicated the TC concept into two more 
modalities. One was with SMEs supplying parts and services to large enterprises: A large enterprise 
helped its cooperative SMEs organize a TC and train their workers in its own in-plant training 
institute or outside training institutes. The other was with the training institutes: They organized 
SMEs located in their vicinity and provided in-service training to their workers. 
1.6.4  Enhanced Competition and Cooperation in Training Markets 
The project promoted market-oriented selection of training institutions. In theory, TCs had 
the freedom to choose the most suitable training institution available in the competitive training 
market. In practice, TCs hired vocational training institutes (VTIs) of the KCCI for most training 
courses; TCs preferred KCCI-sponsored VTIs on account of their merits and the TMs who were 
seconded from the VTIs through government grants. Likewise, other training institutes were also 
contracted on the basis of their merits (e.g.,  auto repair and maintenance training institutes, 
accounting, and motivation training institutes). Since the selection of training institutions were 
based on their merits, more training institutions were  expected to join training  markets, and 
competition in training markets was expected to be keener in the future; hence improved quality of 
training. From 2006, colleges and universities were allowed, in fact, to offer training courses for TC-
member SMEs organized by large enterprises. 
The training managers (TMs) of each TC provided useful services to member SMEs, who normally 
lacked in training specialists and information on the needs for training and training markets. The 
TMs recommended to each member SME the training priorities to be addressed and the training 
institutions to be contracted, administered the training-levy  rebate documents and processes, 
monitored and supervised training services, and evaluated the result of training on behalf of 
member SMEs. TMs filled the organizational and managerial as well as informational gaps prevalent 
in an average SME. 17 
While most SME members of the Busan TC were located in the newly established industrial zone on 
the outskirts of the city, most training institutions were located on the opposite side of the city. This 
long distance discouraged both employers and workers to participate in training programs offered 
at the training institutes. With the progress of this project, an industrial association of the member 
SMEs (the machinery manufacturers association) offered a building and other spaces for the 
establishment of a new training facility right in the center of the industrial zone. This geographical 
proximity enabled the member SMEs to participate in the training programs actively and 
enthusiastically. This also encouraged training institutions to consult with their client SMEs closely 
and more often for the development of training programs, thus being more relevant and demand-
responsive. 
1.6.5  Strengthened Partnerships between Public and Private Entities 
This project strengthened the partnership among central and local government agencies, 
local and national Chambers of Commerce and Industry, training institutions, training experts, 
academics, and SMEs for training and human resources development.   
Representatives of the government (Ministries of Labor and Industry, provincial and municipal 
governments) developed a new relationship with the private sector by becoming members of the TC 
Operating Committee and advising the TC regarding training and human resources development. 
The TCs also periodically held consultative meetings and seminars to monitor and evaluate the 
progress in the project, and suggested/appealed for improved/simplified government procedures 
and processes related to SME training courses and levy  rebates. Such close consultations and 
collaborations between the private and public sectors concerning training and human development 
had no precedent in Korea. As a result of such practice, for example, the training rebate ceilings for 
SMEs were lifted from 200 to 270 percent of the training levy paid, or 1.5 million won to 2.5 million 
won per year; training expenses were reimbursed at the time of the government’s approval of 
training courses, in contrast to the past practice of ex-post reimbursement upon completion of the 
training courses; and the lead time required for submission of a training plan for the government’s 
approval was shortened substantially. 18 
II.  Mainstreaming of the Training Consortiums Project 
2.1  Issues 
Encouraged by the positive results of the training  consortiums  (TC)  pilot  project, the 
government mainstreamed the TC project across the nation beginning in 2003. The government 
decided to expand the coverage of the training-levy rebates to SMEs not only for the recurrent 
expenses of the training managers  (i.e.,  in-service training management,  including visits  and 
consultations with TC members and public relations activities) but also capital expenses for training 
equipment and facilities. Today, together with training programs for unemployed workers, the TC 
program for the training of workers employed by SMEs is the one of the main programs of the 
Ministry of Labor in Korea. In 2007, the TC program trained 295,000 workers of 134,000 SME 
establishments with the training-levy rebates reaching 74.4 billion won (Table 5).
1
Table 5:    Performance of the TC Program 
 
  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007 
Number of TCs Assisted (Cumulative)  6  8  19  30  47  57  69 
Workers Trained (‘000)  4  10  20  38  71  143  295 
Number of SMEs (‘000)  1  3  8  15  33  63  134 
Levies Rebated (Billion Won)  3.2  6.1  14.1  16.8  39.9  45.0  74.4 
Source: Ministry of Labor (2008). 
About eight years have passed since the launch of the pilot TC project, and six years have elapsed 
since the mainstreaming of the  project. However, the impact of the TC program is less than 
magnificent and is far from reaching the original objectives. Between large and small-medium 
enterprises still remains the stark regressiveness in the participation of enterprises in worker 
training and recovery of training levies through rebates. The majority of large enterprises (with 300 
workers or more) trained their workers, and a large part of their workers underwent in-service 
training programs in 2007. Nevertheless, only 13 percent of SMEs offered training service to their 
workers, and only 18 percent of their workers went through in-service training programs in the 
same year. Consequently, large enterprises recovered about 33 percent of their training levies, but 
                                            
1 The number of workers and establishments is a cumulative figure since the same workers and firms were 
counted multiple times that is, every time their training plan proposals were approved and completed. 19 
SMEs recovered only 28  percent  (Table 5). The Employment Insurance Corporation,  under the 
supervision of the Ministry of Labor (MOL), collected some 1.14 trillion won from enterprises as 
training levies but expended only 500 billion won for rebates of training levies and other incentives 
for in-service training of workers in 2007. Therefore, the government accrued 614 billion won or 56 
percent of profits and used the proceeds for purposes other than in-service training of workers in 
2007. The Employment Insurance Corporation manages two funds; one for unemployment, the 
other for training and human resources development. For the unemployment fund, it would be a 
virtue to save as much as possible in preparation for an economic crisis. However, for the training 
fund, accumulation of profits or inefficient use of the fund would be interpreted as a negligence or 
remission of the government’s duties and obligations. The fund should have been used mainly for in-
service training of workers and not for other purposes such as unemployment or pre-service 
training. Since training before employment or during unemployment entails training of general skills 
and not firm-specific skills, it should be financed by general revenues, not by the fund financed by 
employed workers and their employers (Musgrave 1959, Freedman 1962, Becker 1962, Booth and 
Snower 1996). 




Workers Trained*  Levy Recovery Rate 
All Enterprises  15  40  31 
SMEs  13  18  28 
Large Enterprises  482  98  33 
Note:    * Multi-counted figures. 
Source:    Ministry of Labor (2008). 
The original purpose of the TC program was to induce a large proportion of SMEs to train their 
workers  and  develop  human resources so that productivity and competitiveness would be 
enhanced. To this end, the results are extremely limited. Only 13 percent of SMEs trained their 
workers. The fact that 79 percent  of those SMEs training their workers were also members of 
training consortiums (TCs) underscores the need for increasing the proportion of SMEs joining TCs. 
Currently only 4 percent of all SMEs are TC members (Table 6). 
Among total SME workers, a mere 18 percent participated in training. Of these workers, only 24 
percent were workers from TC members (79 percent), and the remaining 76 percent represented 
non-TC members. In other words, 21 percent of those SMEs that trained their workers were non-TC 20 
members, and they accounted for 76 percent of all trained SME workers. This means that most TC-
member SMEs (79 percent) trained their workers, but those trained workers accounted for a small 
proportion of total trained workers (24 percent) and possibly of total workers of those TC-member 
SMEs. If we assume that all TC-member SMEs participated in the training of their workers, only 2 
workers from each TC-member SME were trained, while 26 workers from each non-TC-member 
SMEs participated. These numbers compare unfavorably with 118 workers trained in each large 
enterprise participating in training. If we assume the average number of workers in each TC-member 
SME was about 40 (as was the case with the TCs of the Korea Chamber of Commerce and Industry), 
only 5 percent of total workers of each  SME were trained in 2007. This percentage compares 
extremely unfavorably with 97 percent in large enterprises and 40 percent in advanced countries 
(Table 6). Moreover, the percentages for Korea are based on the number of workers counted 
multiple times (i.e., every time they receive training) while those of advanced countries represent 
only the real number of workers trained in a year without counting workers multiple times. TC-
member SMEs were extremely inactive when compared to non-TC-member SMEs, large enterprises, 
and all enterprises in advanced countries, that is, their counterparts (Tables 7 and 8). 
The government strategy aimed to improve SME productivity through the training of their workers, 
both currently employed and prospective employees, by organizing them into training consortiums 
(Employment Insurance Act of 1993, Enforcement Decree of the Employment Insurance Act of 1995, 
Vocational Training Promotion Act of 1997). However, only 10 percent of SMEs have joined TCs to 
date, and each TC-member SME has trained only 5 percent of its workers in 2007. As a result, a 
mere 4 percent of nationwide SME workers were trained in 2007. 






























Workers (Trained** ‘000)  6,625  (1,218)  18.3  (295)  24  4  (923)  (2,359) 
SMEs **(‘000)  1,284  (169)  13.2  (134)  79  10  (35)    (20) 
Training Levies 
(Rebates ** Billion Won)  556  (157.8)  28.4  (74.4)  470  133  (83.4)  (250) 
* Average No. of Workers 
(Trained**) per Enterprise  5.2  (7.2)    (2.2)      (26)  (118) 
Notes:  *Assumed that all firms train their workers.  ** Multiple counted every time training plans were 
approved and completed. 
Source: Ministry of Labor (2008). 21 
Table 8:    International Comparison of the Percentages of Workers Trained in a Year 
Korea  Canada  Germany  U.K.  U.S.A  Denmark 
14  21  29  40  40  40 
Source:    Ministry of Labor (2008). 
Although data are not available on the average number of workers in each TC-member SME and 
non-TC-member SME, there is no doubt that the participation of SMEs in the  training of their 
workers has not improved noticeably since the completion of the training consortiums pilot project 
in 2002. Rather, the speed of expansion in the TC membership and the degree of participation in 
training among TC-member SMEs slowed substantially. During the pilot project period (2001-2002), 
TC membership expanded threefold in a year despite the start-up difficulties. In contrast, it 
expanded only 2.16-fold a year since the completion of the pilot project. While the number of 
workers trained increased at 2.5 times during the pilot project period, it increased only at 1.97 times 
a year since then to date. Only the training-levy recovery rate increased at a slightly faster rate (1.9 
times vs. 2.1 times) although this is due to an approximately 70 percent increase in the rebate 
ceiling between the two periods (Table 8). 
Table 9:    TC Program Implementation during Pilot and Mainstreaming Periods 




Number of TC-member SMEs  3.00 fold  2.16 fold 
Number of Workers Trained  2.50 fold  1.97 fold 
Amount of Training Levy Rebated    1.91 fold  2.11 fold 
Source: Ministry of Labor (2008). 
2.2  Causes of Issues 
Why then has the pilot TC project  with promising achievements during its pilot stage 
slumped in its performance since it was mainstreamed in 2003? Although there may be many 
reasons for the inactive participation of SMEs in the TC program and meek contribution of the TC 
program to the human resources development activities of SMEs, the following six reasons stand 
out: 
  The training supplier-centered TC program 
  Too few a number of training managers in each TC 22 
  The long distance and low priority of the TC program 
  Lack of on-the-job or in-plant training programs 
  Weak competition and cooperation in training markets 
  Inappropriate government financial supports. 
Each of these causes deserves to be examined in detail. 
2.2.1  Training Supplier-Centered TC Program 
To recap, the TC pilot program was created to overcome the weaknesses in the incentive 
system established in the Employment Insurance Act and Decree in 1993 and 1995, respectively. 
Despite targeted favorable financial incentives, SMEs did not respond positively to them mainly for 
lack of specialized personnel to manage the training. The aim of the TC program, thus, was to 
organize a group of SMEs in the same industrial sector and geographical area into a training 
consortium and to provide the consortium with training managers who then would identify and 
procure training  needs and  services, and supervise/evaluate the training programs collectively 
through the competitive training markets. For example, the first TC in Busan was organized by the 
SMEs belonging to the Shipbuilding Machinery Industrial Association in the vicinity of Busan City 
with the help of Korean  Chamber of Commerce and Industry (KCCI),  which secured  the 
government’s financial assistance. Likewise, the Daewoo TC was organized by SMEs supplying 
intermediate goods to the Daewoo Shipbuilding Corporation. In this case, the Daewoo Corporation 
secured the government’s financial assistance for the TC in order to improve the quality of the 
products received from the small and medium enterprises. 
The nature of the training consortiums changed sharply since mainstreaming of the TC program. 
Under the latest government regulation for implementation of the TC program (Ministry of Labor 
Regulation No. 559), it is stipulated that the operator of the TC is the chief of the training institution, 
and he/she becomes the chairperson of a TC operating committee. One representative of the 
member SMEs attends meetings together with other stakeholders, such as government 
representatives and academics. This is starkly different from the pilot stage of the TC program when 
the SMEs organized the  TC (although often assisted by training institutions and government 
agencies), and one representative of the member SMEs became the chairperson of the TC. There are 
two other major structural changes. First, TMs report directly to the chief of the training institution 23 
(and not the TCs). Second, the government’s additional financial assistance for TCs (e.g., the salaries 
and operating expenses of TMs and the  capital  expenses for equipment and buildings)  now is 
allocated to the training institutions in lieu of the training consortiums. 
Such a supplier-oriented TC program contrasts readily with the health insurance program in Korea. 
Although both programs are financed by the insurance fees, the owner of the health insurance is the 
beneficiary of the insurance scheme, not the health service provider. The decision for choosing a 
health service provider is made by the beneficiaries, not by the health service supplier. When 
assistance is needed in choosing a health service provider, health insurance beneficiaries obtain 
information and advice from relatives, friends, insurance provider, and NGOs, not from the health 
service provider. Also, the government financial assistance for impoverished groups is provided to 
them directly, not to the health service provider. Under the current TC program, however, the 
training institution of a TC decides on and selects the training service provider. In fact, it 
monopolizes all of the training services for member SMEs effectively eliminating competition with 
outside training institutions, and the TMs play no role in this respect. The government’s financial 
assistance for the training of SME workers is provided directly to the training service provider, not to 
the TC. In this sense, a TC is no longer a group organized by SMEs and for SMEs, but an agency 
organized and operated by a training service provider for the benefit of the training institution 
directly and for the SMEs indirectly. Under these circumstances, it is natural that few SMEs will take 
interest in joining a TC and even if they do join, member SMEs will be apathetic towards training 
their workers.   
2.2.2  Too Few a Number of Training Managers in Each Training Consortium 
The government, since mainstreaming, has tried to take advantage of economies of scale in 
providing financial assistance for the training consortiums (TCs).  It  laid down the criteria for 
providing additional financial assistance to a TC as follows: Each TC composed of about 90 SMEs 
would be provided with financial assistance equivalent to 80 percent of the salaries and operating 
expenses of three training managers (TMs) and one assistant as long as they train a cumulative 
number of 2,400 workers in a year (and 4,800 workers when a large enterprise  organizes its 
associated SMEs who provide parts and supplies to it) (Ministry of Labor 2007). For this purpose, it is 
counted as one worker trained when he/she undergoes a training course that lasts eight hours a 24 
day. In practice, a worker undertook training of, on average, 18 hours a year. Therefore, the 
obligation of training 2,400 cumulative workers means in practice 1,067 net workers in a year. 
However, to satisfy the training obligation, TMs have to perform abnormally. To train at least 1,067 
net workers a year, given the above, three TMs in fact have to represent at least 190 SMEs. This is 
because, according to the statistics published by the government, the number of trained workers in 
Korea is about 14 percent of all workers (Table 7 and Ministry of Labor 2008). Since this percentage 
is an average of all sizes of enterprises, it would be a much lower percentage in SMEs. The Labor 
Ministry’s 2008 data show that participation in training-levy rebates by SMEs and their workers 
decreased as the number of workers in each SME became smaller (Table 9). To reach the required 
minimum training target, the TMs would have to increase the TC-member SMEs from 90 to 190 
SMEs under the assumption that each SME employs 40 workers on average [1,067 net workers/(40 
workers × 0.14) = 190 SMEs]. Then it would take more than two months for three TMs to visit each 
of the 190 SMEs. If the average number of workers in each SME was fewer than 40, the three TMS 
would have to counsel a even greater number of SMEs than 190 SMEs. (In fact, the average number 
of SMEs in each TC was not 90, but 1,940 in 2007. Therefore, TM could not have visited a member 
SME for more than two months.)   
With such an interval of visits, TMs cannot be taken seriously by each SME as its own training 
manager, and cannot carry out their duties properly. In practice, each TM can reasonably visit two 
SMEs a day, and can use his/her time to visit member SMEs 15 of the 20 working days a month. This 
means that a TM can reasonably visit about 30 SMEs a month. For TMs to be taken seriously by 
SMEs and to be effective in carrying out their duties, they would have to visit each SME at least once 
a month on average. Therefore, the number of TMs specified  in  the  government’s financial 
assistance should be revised upward by at least two or three times. 25 
Table 10:  Rates of Participation in Training and Levy Rebates by Size of Enterprises 
















Total  1,288  189  15  9.063  3,576  39 
<5  935  38  4  1,452  123  8 
5-9  172  31  18  946  116  12 
10-29  123  43  35  1,520  201  13 
30-49  23  16  70  627  105  17 
50-99  17  19  112  840  198  23 
100-299  12  22  183  1,258  474  38 
SME Sub-Total  1,284  169  13  6,625  1,218  18 
Large Enterprises  4  20  500  2,438  2,358  97 
Note:    *Multiple counted each time they participate. 
Source:    Ministry of Labor (2008). 
2.2.3  Long Distance and Low Priorities of the Training Consortiums Program 
Since the training consortium (TC) is organized by one training supplier, the training location 
is often not ideal—quite the contrary, too far—for member SMEs. Consequently, training hours are 
inconvenient and interest is lost in contracting the training supplier that organized the TC. 
Recognizing this distance problem, a training supplier, when it organized a TC, tended to place 
special emphasis on the location of the prospective member SMEs and not the industrial nature of 
SMEs. TCs often have had weak homogeneity among member SMEs in terms of the industrial nature 
and occupational composition. Accordingly, training courses requested by member SMEs tended to 
be diverse and each course had a relatively small number of workers. The training supplier often 
found it difficult to organize diversified training courses with small numbers of trainees in each 
course, while the TC-member SMEs felt that the training supplier gave low priority and did not tailor 
courses to their demand. 
2.2.4  Lack of On-the-Job or In-Plant Training Programs 
Currently,  almost no TC training suppliers offer on-the-job or in-plant training. Prior to 
becoming the organizing and directing institution of the training consortiums, training suppliers did 
not offer any mobile training and did not have any mobile training facilities and personnel. Even 
after the change in their status, the training suppliers have not had any incentives to procure mobile 
training facilities to offer in-plant or on-the-job training. Government regulations on the TC training 
program stipulate that training-levy rebates shall be made at 100 percent for institutional training 26 
courses, but at 40 percent for in-plan or on-the-job training courses. From the TC-member SMEs’ 
perspective, the government regulations are unfair and inappropriate since SMEs have to stop 
production processes and offer their own machinery and equipment as well as training spaces for in-
plant and on-the-job training courses. They believe that they should be paid more than 100 percent. 
The disincentives against in-plant or on-the-job training are due to the myths of the government 
officials in charge of SME policies regarding the learning and training in SMEs (Ashton et al. 2008). 
The processes of learning and training are quite different depending on the size of enterprises. SMEs 
depend more on informal and on-the-job learning and training processes. Therefore, the 
government’s policy interventions to expand investment in formal and institutional training in SMEs 
are not justified. ILO’s Human Resources Development Recommendation 2004 (No. 195) stresses 
that member states should promote the expansion of workplace learning and training. 
Table 11:  Level of Satisfaction with Training Methods by Enterprise Size 
Size of Enterprise (No. of Workers)  Institutional Training  In-Plant Training * 
5-9  3.17  4.19 
10-49  3.78  4.07 
50-99  3.67  4.05 
100-299  3.69  4.09 
Note: *The higher, the more satisfied. 
Source:    Korea Small Business Institute (2006). 
During the pilot period 2001-2002, about half the SMEs preferred in-plant or on-the-job training 
courses (Lee 2005). Recent surveys of SMEs also showed that SMEs are more satisfied with in-plant 
training than with institutional and distance (correspondence or e-learning) training. This tendency 
was stronger among small-scale  enterprises (Table 11).  There are three basic reasons for this 
preference: (i) institutional training increases the risk of exposing an SME’s technological edge as 
well as its workers to poaching by other competing enterprises on the basis of their higher wages 
and better working conditions (Table 12); (ii) SMEs do not have a sufficient number of workers to 
replace those workers sent for institutional training courses outside the plant (Korean Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry 2007); and, (iii) SMEs promote teamwork among their small numbers of 
workers by involving as many workers as possible in training together at one time even stopping 
production processes for a few days during slack seasons, weekends, or evenings, and enhance their 
productivity in using their own plant facilities rather than using outlandish or too advanced 27 
machinery and equipment in training institutions (Lee 2005). Through many empirical studies, it has 
been demonstrated that in-plant and on-the-job training is superior to institutional training in its 
effects (Bartel 2000; Barret and O’Connell 2001; Groot 1995; Kim et al. 2003; Lee and Kim 2004). 
Table 12:  Reasons for Not Participating in In-Service Training of Workers By Enterprise Size 
Reasons 
Enterprise Size (Number of Workers) 
Total  5-9  10-49  50-99  100-299 
Lack of Substituting Workers*  44.3  48.8  40.4  47.8  20.8 
Lack of Information on Training*  17.9  18.5  15.6  15.2  37.5 
Lack of Worker Interest in Training  13.9  12.9  14.7  17.4  12.5 
Lack of Suitable Training Institutes*  13.1  7.0  18.7  17.4  25.0 
Concerns about Poaching on Training*  8.1  11.1  5.8  2.2  4.2 
Other Reasons  2.7  1.7  4.9  0  0 
Total  100  100  100  100  100 
(Sample Size:    SMEs)  582  287  225  46  24 
Note:    *Reasons related to the SMEs’ preference for in-plant training. 
Source: Korea Small Business Institute (2006). 
2.2.5  Weak Competition and Cooperation in Training Markets 
Government policies and incentives have run counter to building up training markets and 
promoting competition in the markets. Post-mainstreaming has meant not only a near-monopoly of 
training services by a single supplier but also that any outside services have not been counted as 
training records, effectively stifling  cooperation or  collaboration  among training institutions. To 
change a training supplier once a TC has been organized by a training institute, the member SMEs 
have to leave the TC. Yet, the government has provided no financial assistance to new training 
institutions in the last eight years; rather it has exclusively and continuously funded the existing TC 
training institutes, thereby eliminating choice. Monopolization of training services is likely to lower 
the quality of training services, but there has been no practice of rigorous evaluation of the 
performances and effects of training courses or institutions to date. 28 
2.2.6  Inappropriate Government Financial Assistance 
The mainstay of the financial assistance for TCs has been not the recurrent expenses of the 
training managers (TMs), but the capital expenses for training facilities up to an annual ceiling of 1.5 
billion won (the average exchange rate in the past eight years was about US$1.00=1,000 Korean 
won). Moreover, the training equipment financed to date has not included any mobile training 
facilities. It has been used primarily to refurbish the existing equipment and facilities and also for 
pre-employment training programs, which are the core of the training institutes’ regular programs. 
In brief, the government’s financial assistance to the training consortiums (TCs) has not served as an 
incentive for member SMEs to undertake the training of their workers. 
The reasons for the government’s emphasis on capital assistance may have a dual purpose: to 
expedite disbursements of annual budget before the end of a fiscal year to help boost the economy 
in recession; and to compensate for the lack of regular budgets for replacement and upkeep of 
training equipment and facilities in many education and training institutes on a periodic basis.  
Even though a TC requires greater recurrent expenses for publicity and personnel services by TMs 
and their assistants, the government decree requires TCs to finance 20 percent of those recurrent 
expenses. In view of the non-profit nature of a TC and the monopoly power of the training service 
supplier of a TC, however, the burden of such counterpart fund requirements must have been 
shifted from the training institute to member SMEs by lowering the quality of training services. 
Of course, the  government’s financial assistance to the  TCs has been made in the context of 
competition with other human resources development programs. While the government has been 
stingy in expanding financial assistance for the recurrent expenses of the pilot-tested TCs, it has 
been generous in financing new but inefficient programs. The budget allocations  and incentive 
systems have sent SMEs confusing or wrong signals. As a result, scarce resources have been wasted, 
and financial assistance failed to induce SMEs to reinvigorate the TC program. For example, a large 
amount of funds have been spent for the retraining of workers, especially for the unemployed. It 
has been pointed out in the research of international organizations that conventional retraining 
programs for the unemployed are inefficient and non-viable in comparison with in-service training 
programs; graduates of the former rarely achieved employment rates higher than 60 percent in 
either OECD or developing countries (Dar et al. 1998;  Gil et al.  1999). In Korea, the retraining 
programs for the unemployed have rarely achieved employment rates higher than 35 percent for 29 
the trainees. Just as pre-service vocational education is not a good instrument for preventing youth 
unemployment  problems (Psacharopoulos 1997), retraining may not be an effective policy 
instrument for relieving unemployed workers. Another example is the SMEs in-plant learning groups 
program, which was launched a few years ago. Its emphasis on in-plant training is commendable, 
but the government’s financial assistance for this program per trained worker has been more than 
100 times that of the TC program (27,000,000 vs. 250,000 won per worker trained), although no 
clear evidence has yet been demonstrated of its relative effectiveness. Still another example is the 
massive pre-service training programs financed by the training levies. As pre-service training and 
retraining programs impart not firm-specific skills but general skills, these programs should be 
financed by general revenues, not with earmarked insurance funds financed by enterprises for their 
employed workers. 30 
III.  DIRECTIONS FOR PROMOTING SME PRODUCTIVITY 
In order to accelerate the training consortiums (TC) program, which aims to elevate the 
productivity of SMEs, policy makers will have to focus on the factors that have contributed to the 
lukewarm performance of the TC Program since it was mainstreamed. Policy makers should 
encourage a greater number of SMEs to join TCs by transforming the TCs to member-centered or 
demand-driven organizations. They should also encourage each TC-member SME to participate in 
the training of their workers more actively than in the past by financing a greater number of training 
managers (TMs)  hired by each TC and emphasizing  in-plant or on-the-job training. Also, the 
government’s financial incentive systems for training should focus on efficient programs and be 
simplified in the processes of training plans and levy rebates. 
3.1  Transformation of Training Consortiums into SME-Centered Organizations 
The government should change the rules for organizing TCs so that SMEs are the center of 
the organization and have the power to make operational decisions. An SME representative should 
be the chairperson of the operating committee, and other members of the committee including the 
representative of training institutions should play more advisory roles. Also, the training managers 
(TMs) may be seconded by a training institution but should be hired by the TCs and should be 
directed by the respective operating committee, not by the training institutions. The TCs should be 
free to choose training institutions in accordance with the demands of its members and free to 
enter into a training contract with training institutions in a competitive manner. Such a training 
contract should not be an exclusive, long-term contract, but be renewable at the discretion of the TC 
operating committee. The TCs should be able to hire more than one training institutions at a time, 
depending on the demands for training. 
More concretely, the government should help about 100 SMEs located in the same geographic area 
and belonging to the similar industrial sectors to organize themselves voluntarily into a TC by 
providing financial assistance for the activities of three TMs and one assistant. In this manner, each 
SME would be visited by the TMs at least once a month, and a total of 3,500 TCs would be organized 
in a short period of time. This target compares with a total of 69 TCs in 2007. The target of 3,500 TCs 
would comprise 350,000 SMEs (26 percent of a total of 1.29 million SMEs), compared with 134,000 31 
SMEs (10 percent of total SMEs) in 2007. This number of SMEs has been selected on the basis of 
those SMEs with five or more workers. The reason for excluding SMEs with less than five workers is 
that they account for as much as 73 percent of total SMEs, but have participated in training of their 
workers at a very low level (Table 9); it will be too costly to cover them in the TC program in the 
short term. 
































2007 Actual  1.22  18%  134    10%    300  6%  4% 
Short-Term 
Target  2.18  33%  350  26%  2,060  40%  31% 
Source:  Ministry of Labor 2008 and author’s computation. 
3.2  Short-Term Targets for Active Participation of SMEs in the TC Program 
To promote the participation of SMEs in the TC program, the government should establish 
short-term targets. In the short term, the government should aim to train 2.18 million SME workers, 
which would account for 33 percent of total SME workers (6.62 million workers) or 40 percent of the 
short-term target SME workers (5.17 million workers of 350,000 SMEs). This target number of 
trained workers  (2.18 million)  compares with 1.22 million SME workers, which account  for 18 
percent of total SME workers or 6 percent of short-term target SME workers in 2007. In particular, 
the target for trained workers (2.06 million), which is 40 percent of the short-term target SME 
workers (5.17 million), is comparable with the actual percentage of trained workers in advanced 
countries (Table 7) without double counting, and means that out of 2.18 million total SME trained 
workers, 2.06 million workers will be trained by TCs. 
To attain such short-term targets, the government may have to finance, not 80 percent as at 
present, but 100 percent of the personnel and operating expenses of three TMs hired by each TC. 
The only counterpart contribution to be made by each TC may be providing adequate office spaces 
for the TMs and their assistance. The government may also finance the replacement of existing and 
additional new facilities for training institutions, but it should be done under a program separate 
from the TC program, to induce new, and expansion of existing, training institutions. It is difficult 32 
and inappropriate to estimate and finance additional training facilities only for a TC program. To 
date, there have been no training facilities catering to the TC training program only.   
The financial costs of the short-term target for the TC program are estimated at a total of about 700 
billion won. This estimation is based on an annual assistance of about 0.2 billion won per TC 
(personnel costs of 125 million won and operating activities of 75 million won). The total costs are 
equivalent to 50 percent of the Labor Ministry’s total training expenditures of 1.4 billion won in 
2007 and 58 percent of the Ministry’s total expenses for SME training in 2007. In view of the 
importance of promoting the productivity of SMEs, this level of expenditures would be reasonable. 
The government’s total financial assistance for the TC program per year and the training cost is 
equivalent to 450,000 won per trained worker, which is relatively lower than that in advanced 
countries. This level of unit cost is also much lower than other government investment programs to 
create more employment opportunities. The accelerated short-term TC program would produce an 
additional 14,000 jobs for TMs and assistants, which is about 20 percent of the government’s target 
for creating new jobs in 2009. The economic viability of such in-service training programs has been 
well documented in literature already (Bartel 2000; Barret and O’Connell 2001; Groot 1995; Kim et 
al. 2003; Lee and Kim 2004).   
3.3  Strengthening On-the-Job Training 
The SMEs’ preference for workplace training has been already pointed out; therefore, the 
government  should repeal the discriminatory training-levy  rebate clauses in the TC regulations 
against workplace training and help SMEs access the skills development opportunities that are 
tailored to their specific requirements (i.e., on-the-job training and in-plant training). Indeed, the 
government’s capital assistance to training institutions should be confined to mobile training 
facilities since they are the major additional facilities needed for carrying out the TC program. The 
government should also encourage training institutions and TMs to spend more time and effort in 
planning and executing  in-plant and mobile training  programs.  The proximity of public training 
institutions to the members of the training consortiums should be revisited and the establishment 
of new training centers considered. 33 
3.4  Flexible Standards for Training Expenses and Simplified Administrative Processes 
Government regulations regarding the TC program have become much more flexible, and 
the processes have been speedier since the program was mainstreamed in 2003. Training course 
proposals have been approved in shorter periods of time, and the  government’s approval for 
training-levy rebates have been obtained not upon completion of training courses, but at the time 
when the training proposals are approved. The  training-levy  rebates were paid directly to the 
training institutions if the involved SMEs requested it when applying for the rebates, and the ceilings 
for training-levy rebates have been raised a few times. 
However, some rigid and unnecessary regulations still remain. These parts of the regulations should 
be revised or repealed soon to promote the TC programs. The government has been preoccupied 
with a large number of training outputs and economies of scale in promoting the TC program. As 
such, its regulations have been inflexible in the minimum size and length of training courses eligible 
for training-levy rebates. The minimum size and length had been 30 workers for 20 hours until the 
recent repeal. However, the amount of the training-levy rebate per worker trained still remains the 
same for any size and length of training course below 30 workers and 20 hours. For such courses, 
the sum of rebates does not cover direct costs of training. Such inflexible standards for the rebate 
do not take into account the small scale of training courses due to the small number of workers of 
TC-member SMEs and discourages SMEs to participate actively in the TC program. The minimum size 
and length of training courses for the rebate amount per worker should be adjusted downwards. 
The current standards are inconsistent with those for other training programs assisted by the 
government. For example, the recently launched SME In-Plant Study Group program receives 
government financial assistance as long as a study group has five workers or more and more than 
two meetings a week with no minimum hours required. 
The government delegated most but not all tasks related to the TC program to the Human 
Resources Corporation, making the application process bureaucratic and cumbersome. Recognition 
of training institutions  for participation in the TC program requires approval from the HR 
Corporation, but approvals for training courses to be eligible for training-levy rebates are done by 
the Labor Ministry’s field offices. To obtain an approval for a training course eligible for training-levy 
rebates, 18 documents are required altogether. Under these circumstances, the TMs have become 
bureaucratic paper pushers rather than training managers and specialists. 34 
IV.  CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
To sustain growth with equity and strengthen international competitiveness in the midst of 
knowledge-based globalization, the Korean government concentrated on elevating the productivity 
of SMEs, which account for a large part of national production, exports, and employment. This 
challenge has been accentuated by the current world economic crisis. The financial crisis has turned 
into a sharp downfall of the real economy, and high unemployment is looming on the horizon. 
Studies across countries point out that retraining of unemployed workers is not an effective and 
efficient policy measure, whereas in-service training of currently employed workers helps prevent or 
mitigate unemployment prospects in a much more efficient way by increasing the labor productivity 
of SMEs and thereby strengthening their competitiveness. 
For a long time, it was understood that SMEs did  not invest in their human resources or 
technological development. However, it has been revealed that they are as interested as large 
enterprises. The reasons why they are less active in the training of their workers are partly their 
small scale and financial weaknesses, and partly the failure of training markets and the public goods 
nature of training (Booth and Snower 1996;  Dowson 1997;  Tanburn 2002). Many  governments 
mobilized policy tools to make SMEs more active in developing their workers’  skills and 
competences. Some governments used regulations (e.g., Sweden) or levies (France and most Latin 
American countries) to force SMEs to invest in their workers. Others used general taxes to finance 
external training (e.g., Mexico and Poland). Still, others used fiscal incentives to reward individual 
enterprises investing in their workers (e.g.,  Chile). Nothing worked well for SMEs. Financial 
incentives alone were not only insufficient to motivate SMEs, but also created an  inequitable 
situation between large and small enterprises. 
The TC pilot project reviewed in this paper  demonstrated that once SMEs were given 
institutional/technical assistance  through training specialists/managers, in addition to financial 
incentives, they were willing to adequately invest in their workers and were able to improve their 
productivity in an effective and sustainable manner. They also forestalled sharp retrenchments and 
unemployment of their workers. On the one hand, all enterprises including SMEs were required to 
take collective action to develop their workers’ skills by making financial contributions to a common 
fund, and SMEs in particular were encouraged to organize themselves for training along the same 35 
industry and location (i.e., into a training consortium). SMEs were assisted by their private 
associations or large enterprises in organizing themselves. On the other hand, SMEs were given a 
generously high level of rebates for their costs of training workers. The organized SMEs collectively 
hired training specialists to manage the training affairs of individual member SMEs, but the 
personnel and operating expenses of the training managers were financed on government accounts. 
TMs were entrusted to identify training needs, plan training activities, and select quality training 
suppliers on a competitive market basis, form strong partnership with relevant stakeholders, and 
learn from their own and peer organizations’ experiences (Lee 2006). 
Since mainstreamed, the TC program has not been as effective as expected in its achievements. 
Although the TC program has expanded rapidly in number, its contribution to training outputs of 
SMEs has not been impressive and substantial. Many factors must have contributed to the less than 
satisfactory performance of the TC program. The most outstanding reasons are that the TCs have 
turned into training supplier-centered organizations, with  SMEs gradually losing  interest and 
enthusiasm in training. To reinvigorate the TC program, the government will have to change the TC 
into SME-oriented TCs, and realign incentive systems for the TC program to be demand-driven and 
SME-centered rather than a administrative convenience for the government. 36 
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www.worldbank.org/sp. Summary Findings
This paper is about the ev olution of an inno vative in-service training 
program and its effects in Korea.  In many developing countries, small- 
and medium- scale enterprises (SMEs) play important roles in outputs, 
exports, and employment.  Therefore, governments have used various 
policy instruments to promote productivity of SMEs through in-service 
training of their workers.  However, those policy tools have not been 
effective to date. An exception to this gener al trend was found in Korea.   
The Government of Korea tested a pilot in-service training project and 
achieved signiﬁ cant results.   The go vernment encour aged SMEs to 
organize themselves into training consortiums (TCs) and pro vided them 
with institutional and technical assistance by ﬁ  nancing employment of 
training specialists who manages human resources development of TC-
member SMEs.  Since mainstreaming, nevertheless, the progress of the 
TC program has been less than magniﬁ  cent.  Some factors responsible 
for the lukewarm achievements are analyzed and policy measures for 
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